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GLOBALIZATION AND THE GROWTH OF
EXECUTIVE POWER: AN OLD STORY
ALASDAIR ROBERTS*
ABSTRACT

Americans have always worried about an undue concentration of
power in the executive branch. Recently, people have worried that
globalization might be making the problem even worse. But the concern
is overstated, or at least misstated. Globalization is not a new
phenomenon, and most of its effect on executive power was realized
decades ago. And globalizationmight undermine executive power, rather
than bolster it, either because globalization undermines the authority of
the nation-state or shifts authority to technocrats. If there is a general
tendency toward increased executive power in the twenty-first century,
this is might attributable more directly to other factors, such as
intensified electoral
information technology,
improvements in
competition, and judicial decisions that have undermined checks on the
accumulation of authority in the executive branch.
INTRODUCTION

This is a story about the apparent collision between an old anxiety
and a new trend in economic and social affairs. The old anxiety is the
fear of uncontrolled executive power.' The United States emerged from
a revolution against monarchy, and the system established under the
Constitution of 1789 was one in which the power of the president was
carefully hedged. But the pressure of events often undermined the
initial design. Throughout the twentieth century, the power of the
president grew. In 1973, the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. lamented
the rise of an "imperial presidency" marked by habits of secrecy and
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1. See generally HOWARD FINEMAN, THE THIRTEEN AMERICAN ARGUMENTS: ENDURING
DEBATES THAT DEFINE AND INSPIRE OUR COUNTRY 159-77 (2008) (describing the growth
and decline of presidential power).
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exclusion in both foreign and domestic affairs. 2 Schlesinger issued
another warning about the imperial presidency thirty years later,
during the administration of George W. Bush. The "constitutional
balance," Schlesinger said, referencing the post-Watergate Nixon
Administration, had been "upset in favor of presidential power and at
the expense of presidential accountability." 3
The new trend that seems to be upsetting the constitutional balance
of powers even further is globalization. Wallace Steger defines
globalization as "a set of social processes that are thought to transform
our present social condition into one of globality . .. [that is,] a social
condition characterized by the existence of global economic, political,
cultural and environmental interconnections and flows that make many
of the currently existing borders and boundaries irrelevant." 4 We might
put this more concretely as a condition distinguished by the increased
flow of money, goods, people, and information across national borders. It
is driven by the inherent dynamics of capitalism, technological
innovations, and decisions by governments over the last forty years that
have lowered the barriers to cross-border flows.
There are three reasons why globalization might seem to enhance
executive power within the American system of government. The first is
that many subjects once regarded as matters of domestic policy-such
as financial regulation or food and drug safety-are now also addressed
in supranational forums, in which national executives have traditionally
enjoyed the leading role. In fact, the growing importance of
international organizations and intergovernmental networks is said to
be producing a new era of "transnational governance."5 The second is
that porous borders have made the United States vulnerable to new
security threats-such as terrorist and cyber attacks, pandemics, and
even unexpected economic shocks-and the task of managing these
various "security crises" is again something that has been traditionally

2. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 208 (1973).
3. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., WAR AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 45 (2004). See

also Andrew Rudalevige, The Contemporary Presidency: The Decline and Resurgence and
Decline (and Resurgence?) of Congress: Charting a New Imperial Presidency, 36
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 506 (2006) (reviewing the impact of imperial presidencies prior
before and after September 11, 2011).
4. MANFRED B. STEGER, GLOBALIZATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 7-8 (1st ed.

2003).
5. See generally HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (Thomas Hale & David
Held eds., 2011) (describing the advent of transnational governance); ANNE-MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (outlining the interrelationship between
intergovernmental
networks
and
transnational
governance);
TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE (Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson eds., 2006) (describing the
growth of intergovernmental networks).
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regarded as an executive function. Executives often declare de jure or de
facto "states of emergency" in response to such crises, which justifies the
6
expansion of executive discretion. The third is globalization seems to
aggravate the phenomenon of "social acceleration"-that is, the
7
quickening of social and economic change. This naturally tends to shift
power to the executive because legislative bodies appear unable to
address new challenges with sufficient speed, and because the
mechanism by which legislatures express their preferences-that is,
statutory law-may also be too rigid to accommodate a rapidly-changing
world.
The argument that the current phase of globalization is aggravating
the problem of executive power is appealing but overstated. In fact,
globalization is not a new phenomenon, and most of its effect on
executive power was realized decades ago. Modern-day globalization
might actually undermine executive power, either because it limits the
authority of the nation-state or shifts influence to technocrats within
the executive branch. If there is a general tendency toward increased
executive power in the twenty-first century, it might be more directly
attributable to other factors. One factor is the steady improvement of
information technology, which has the effect of changing public
perceptions about the responsibilities of the federal government and of
the president in particular. Another factor could be intensified electoral
competition at the federal level, which causes presidents to make bigger
promises about the actions they will take to improve the lives of voters.
Yet another factor could be a set of judicial decisions that have
weakened the constitutional checks on the expansion of federal and
executive power.
I. AN OLD STORY
Arguments about the connection between globalization and
executive power sometimes refer to an earlier phase in American history
when the nation was largely disengaged from world affairs and
6. For a discussion about the invocation of emergency powers in response to terror
attacks, see MICHAEL FREEMAN, FREEDOM OR SECURITY: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR
DEMOCRACIES USING EMERGENCY POWERS TO FIGHT TERROR 1-24 (2003). However,

emergency powers are often sought in response to economic crises as well. Franklin
Roosevelt did this at the start of his presidency. See ALASDAIR ROBERTS, FOUR CRISES OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: REPRESENTATION, MASTERY, DISCIPLINE, ANTICIPATION 84-86

(2017). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, adopted in response to the
financial crisis, also provided broad discretion to the executive branch. See George Will,
Bailing Out of the Constitution, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2009, at A15.
7. See WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN,
ACCELERATION OF TIME 1-26 (2004).
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executive power was limited. This golden age of isolation was described
by James Bryce in his famous study of American government, published
in 1887, stated "America, has little occasion to think of foreign affairs."8
He further stated "[she] lives in a world of her own, ipsa suis pollens
opibus, nihil indiga nostri."9 Although Bryce acknowledged the power of
the president could expand in wartime, in peacetime his power "is not
great."10 "A President can do little, for he does not lead either Congress
or the nation."n "In ordinary times the President may be compared to
the senior or managing clerk in a large business establishment, whose
chief function is to select his subordinates, the policy of the concern
being in the hands of the board of directors."12
Bryce's view was shared by Woodrow Wilson, who wrote in 1885
that the office of the president had little influence or prestige and that
"the power of Congress has become predominant."' 3 Wilson conceded
that it had not always been this way. In the first decades of its history,
the American government was constantly "quarreling and fighting" with
European powers, and this had naturally extended the role of the early
Presidents, "since theirs was the office of negotiation" in foreign
affairs.1 4 But in 1885, the country was at peace. The Civil War had been
over for twenty years, there had not been a significant dispute over
national borders in almost forty years, and wars to pacify "Indian
country" were largely concluded. For all these reasons, Wilson observed,
presidential influence was waning.
In fact, though, the moment described by Bryce and Wilson was
unusual. As Wilson conceded, most of the preceding century of
American history had been dominated by worries about threats posed by
external influences, and about the indeterminacy and porosity of the
nation's borders. These were circumstances that encouraged the
8. JAMES BRYCE, 3 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 117 (London, Macmillan 1888)
[hereinafter BRYCE 31.
9. JAMES BRYCE, 1 THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 412 (London, Macmillan 1888)
[hereinafter BRYCE 1]. The italicized words are drawn from a poem by Lucretius. It
translates roughly as: It is completely self-sufficient and does not need us. In 1911, the
writer Sydney Brooks described the American situation in these terms: "[That happy or
harmful isolation which has relieved America from the effects, at once complicating and
fortifying, of a constant external pressure. Alone among the great Powers the United
States is not menaced. . . .[The nation exists] in an almost unvexed tranquility. Nothing
endangers her national security." See Sydney Brooks, American Foreign Policy, 271
LIVING AGE, Dec. 9, 1911, at 603, 603.
10. BRYCE 1, supra note 10, at 83.
11. Id. at 392.
12. Id. at 85.
13. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 43 (Boston, Houghton Mifilin
Co., 2d ed. 1885).
14. Id.
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expansion of executive power. During the quasi-war with France from
1798 to 1800, for example, President John Adams acquired a broad
power to imprison or deport hostile aliens, and to prosecute conspiracies
that "oppose[d] any measure or measures of the government."' 5 In 1803,
Thomas Jefferson abandoned his own statements about the limits of
presidential power in order to execute the Louisiana Purchase, which he
6
considered to be essential to the "peace and security of the nation."'
The attempt by Jefferson's administration to prohibit overseas trade, an
action intended to preserve U.S. neutrality during the Napoleonic Wars,
also provoked complaints about the unconstitutional accumulation of
17
James
executive power and the advent of "unblushing tyranny."
Monroe, a prot6g6 of Jefferson, also purported to take a limited view of
presidential powers but nonetheless expanded those powers during the
First Seminole War. Presidents Tyler and Polk, also expanded executive
powers as tensions mounted with Mexico over the annexation of Texas
in the 1840s.18 And the Civil War resulted in an extraordinary
9
concentration of authority in the hands of President Abraham Lincoln.'
The century after the 1880s was also distinguished by an expansion
of presidential power in response to threats posed by uncertain or
porous borders. Challenges to American security came in three different
forms. First, there were threats to the United States posed by other
states. The executive acquired extraordinary authority over economic
and social affairs after the United States entered World War I in 1917.
This is often regarded as a "foreign war," but domestic support for
15. See generally Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (giving the president
authority to imprison and deport "dangerous" non-citizens); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1
Stat. 577 (1798) (granting the president power to imprison and deport non-citizens from a
hostile nation); Sedition Act, ch. 74, § 1, 1 Stat. 596 (1978) (criminalizing the act of making
false statements criticizing the federal government).
16. President Thomas Jefferson, Statement to the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States (Jan. 16, 1804); see also HENRY ADAMS, 2 HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS

JEFFERSON 90 (New York, C. Scribner's Sons 1889).
17. Theseus, Letter to the Editor of the North American, NORTH AM. & MERCANTILE
DAILY ADVERTISER, May 26, 1808, at 2, 2. See generally Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat.
451; Enforcement Act, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 473 (1808) (together granting Jefferson the executive
power to enforce the Alien and Sedition Acts); James Duncan Phillips, Jefferson's "Wicked
Tyrannical Embargo", 18 NEw ENG. Q., Dec. 1945, at 466 (1945) (examining the effects of
the 1808 Jefferson embargo on the United States economy through a case study of Salem,
Massachusetts).
18. See ARTHUR BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 46,

70-72, 109 (1921).
19. As James Bryce acknowledged: "Abraham Lincoln wielded more authority than any
single Englishman has done since Oliver Cromwell. It is true that the ordinary law was
for some purposes practically suspended during the War of Secession." BRYCE 1, supra
note 10, at 84.
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American engagement was also driven by concern that Germany was
attempting to incite Mexico to attack the United States. 20 Japan's direct
assault on America in 1941 precipitated another concentration of
executive authority as the United States entered World War II. By the
early 1950s, the Soviet Union was known to have the capacity to drop
nuclear weapons on American soil with long-range bombers, a fact that
made national borders seem inconsequential. The advent of the long
Cold War meant that the unusual power of a wartime president would
become a fact of everyday life. In 1948, Clinton Rossiter called it a state
of "constitutional dictatorship."21
A second dimension of national vulnerability arose from the flow of
people across American borders. 22 Immigration into the United States
was largely unrestricted at the start of the twentieth century-except
for immigration from China, which was prohibited by Congress in
1882.23 Until the early 1890s, immigrants never met a federal official
when they landed at an American port. Between 1900 and 1909, roughly
eight hundred thousand people arrived in the United States every
year-an extraordinary number, given that the total population was
only about eighty million. Many people regarded this unrestricted flow
as a serious threat to American democracy because many immigrants
were illiterate and "backward in western ideas." Immigrants were also
blamed for the spread of "foreign creeds" such as anarchism, socialism,
and communism; for acts of terror, such as the assassination of
President William McKinley in 1901 and a wave of bomb attacks in
1919; and for increasing radicalism within the American labor
movement. From 1917 until the 1960s, the country was seized with the
fear that "subversive red elements" had insinuated themselves into
major American institutions. The result of these anxieties was another
buildup of executive power, through the adoption of immigration laws
that granted broad discretion over the entry and removal of aliens,
through the establishment of new institutions for counterintelligence
such as the Federal Bureau of Intelligence, and through systems of
"loyalty testing" for public employees.
A third dimension of national vulnerability had to do with the
economy. For most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
American economy was very open: American businesses depended

20. U.S. State Department-Office of the Historian, U.S. Entry into World War I, 1917,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914- 1920/wwi (last visited May 19, 2017).
21. See generally CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP (1948).
22. This paragraph draws on ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 30-68.
23. U.S. State Department-Office of the Historian, ChineseImmigration and the
Chinese Exclusion Acts, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/chineseimmigration (last visited May 19, 2017).
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heavily on the inflow of capital from London, Paris, and Amsterdam,
24
and trade between the United States and Europe was extensive.
Indeed, the idea of a self-contained "American economy" did not become
familiar until the late 1930s. The reality before that time was deep
25
integration into a trans-Atlantic economic system. One consequence of
this reality was that the United States was vulnerable to economic
shocks from overseas: this was another respect in which borders were
inconsequential. "We are part and parcel of a great world economic
system," an American banker said in 1922. "Distress anywhere reacts
on us . . . ."26 The Long Depression of 1873 to 1896, which caused social
unrest and political upheaval across the United States, was a
thoroughly international crisis. Events overseas also contributed to the
United States' Panic of 1907, its Depression of 1920-21, and to the
27
financial crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s.
By the 1930s, neither the American people nor the American
establishment were prepared to continue suffering from the economic
pain and social unrest that followed from these periodic economic
shocks. Some method had to be found to buffer the newly invented
"American economy" from external influences and regulate that
economy so that it was not afflicted with severe cycles of boom and bust.
The result was the invention of an extensive federal apparatus for
controlling monetary and fiscal policy, regulating private enterprises,
28
and providing income support to the American people. This was the
New Deal apparatus; after the Second World War, it was complemented
by the Bretton Woods system for coordinating national economies and
controlling cross-border capital flows. 29 One effect of these reforms was
to increase, yet again, the power of the American president. The
president was assigned the main responsibility for managing the
economy. He was responsible for oversight of the domestic apparatus for

24. See ALASDAIR ScoTT ROBERTS, AMERICA'S FIRST GREAT DEPRESSION: ECONOMIC
CRISIS AND POLITICAL DISORDER AFTER THE PANIC OF 1837, at 1-11 (2012).

25. For example, see the description of the "economic system of civilization" in BROOKS
ADAMS, AMERICA'S ECONOMIC SUPREMACY (New York, Macmillan 1900).

26. Europe Must Go to Work, KAN. CITY STAR, May 17, 1922, at 5.
27. See CHARLES POOR KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS,

PANICS AND

CRASHES A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 123-42 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2005) (1978);
ROBERT M. MACIVER, THE WEB OF GOVERNMENT 289 (1947) (observing about the Great
Depression, "The failure . . . of a bank in Austria, the Credit Anstalt, had grave
repercussions over the civilized world, precipitating a whole train of economic
disturbances. The credit mechanism had become an international one so that a block,
interference, crisis or depression anywhere affected the livelihood of peoples hundreds or
thousands of miles away.").
28. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 89-90.
29. JEFFREY A FRIEDEN. GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS FALL AND RISE IN THE TWENTIETH

CENTURY 278-300 (Norton 2006).
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economic management, as well as the conduct of international economic
affairs through the Bretton Woods institutions. The president's new
responsibilities were affirmed in the Employment Act of 1946, which
gave the president a new Council of Economic Advisers and required
that he issue an annual report outlining his program for maintaining
employment, production, and purchasing power. 30
The effect of all these trends was to produce a system of government
that was radically different than that described by Bryce and Wilson in
the 1880s. By the mid-1950s, the dominance of the president within the
federal government was firmly established. There were, of course,
widespread concerns about the concentration of executive power. The
period between 1920 and 1980 was characterized by attempts to find
ways of taming executive power-for example by overhauling
congressional oversight, revising the body of administrative law and
methods of judicial review, and improving the capacity of journalists
and other nongovernment organizations to monitor the work of
executive agencies. But the important point is that this rapid growth of
executive power did happen-and moreover, happened mainly as a
response to the perceived vulnerability of American society to attacks or
shocks from abroad.
II. How GLOBALIZATION UNDERMINES EXECUTIVE POWER

In sum, we can see that concerns about the indeterminacy or
porosity of borders are not peculiar to the post-1980 "age of
globalization." They have always shaped the development of American
government. Any effect that the current wave of globalization might
have on the balance of powers today is small compared to the effects
that were felt in preceding decades. In other words, they are effects on
the margins. The main impact of globality on executive power was
manifested at least a half century ago, and in fact the country is already
well practiced in the art of reconciling this expanded executive authority
with its longstanding fears about the potential abuse of concentrated
power.
We might even go further than this. We could even argue that
modern-day globalization is actually undermining executive power,
rather than enhancing it. There are two arguments that we might make
in support of this claim. The first argument has to do with the apparent
decline of state authority overall, while the second has to do with the
balance of power within the executive branch, between politicians and
technocrats.
30. See Employment Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-304, § 3(a).
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First, we will consider the argument about globalization and overall
state authority. Obviously the power of the president is limited by the
overall capacities of the national government: a strong president in a
weak government may be still disadvantaged in comparison to a weak
president in a strong government. And in this respect, we must observe
that there has been a tendency over the last two decades to argue that
the main effect of globalization has been to undermine the power of the
nation-state as a whole. This line of argument was set out by Ken'ichi
Omae in an influential 1995 book, The End of the Nation State. Political
leaders, Omae argued, had made the mistake of assuming that there
"always would be borders between countries." But this was a mistake:
trade, investment, information, and people now flowed "relatively
unimpeded across national borders." One of the consequences was a
decline in the relevance of national governments. The idea of a nationstate, Omae concluded, was "a nostalgic fiction" at the end of the
twentieth century, nation-states were "little more than bit actors" on the
3
global stage. 1
Omae was not alone in making such arguments. The French
diplomat Jean-Marie Gu6henno also published a book titled The End o)
the Nation-State in 1995. Gu6henno took a similarly grim view about
the effects of globalization on national sovereignty. He argued that the
state had been "bypassed by transnational games" and no longei
functioned as "the natural space of solidarity and political control"; ii
was too remote to manage the problems of our daily life, and "toc
32
constrained to confront the global problems that affect us." In 1996
the British academic Susan Strange also lamented "the retreat of thE
state" as a result of globalization. State authority had been hollowed
out, Strange argued: "Heads of governments may be the last tc
recognize that they and their ministers have lost the authority ovel
national societies and economies that they used to have. Their commanc
33
The American politica
over outcomes is not what it used to be."
scientist Jessica Mathews concurred, arguing in 1997 that globalization
had brought an end to the centuries-long trend toward "concentration 0:
power in the hands of states . . . The absolutes of the Westphaliar
34
system ... are all dissolving."

31. KEN'ICmfl OMAE,

THE END

OF THE NATION

STATE: THE RISE OF

REGIONAl

ECONOMIES 12 (1995).
32. JEAN-MARIE GUtHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE 11-13 (1995).
33. SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN TI

WORLD ECONOMY 3 (1996).
34. Jessica Matthews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 50 (1997).
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I have argued elsewhere that these predictions about the demise of
the nation-state may be overwrought. 35 National governments have
been vigorous in reasserting authority in the new millennium,
especially in the drive to address new threats to national security and
internal order. Indeed, the 2016 presidential race in the United States
provides evidence of the resurgence of a more muscular nationalism,
with calls for a strengthened military, tighter border controls, and new
restrictions on trade and international finance.
Suppose, though, that we put these reservations aside for the
moment, and accept that there might be some merit to the argument
that globalization is weakening the overall power of states. If this is the
case, then the effect is to corrode the power of all national actors,
including the executive. Susan Strange made this point directly. As she
said in 1996, it is "heads of government[s] ...
[who] lost the authority
over national societies and economies that they used to have." 36 Perhaps
it is true that executives play an increased role in international
negotiations, or within the mechanisms of transnational governancebut we ought to regard this as a defensive strategy that is intended to
preserve influence in a world that is witnessing a general decline in the
power of national governments.
There is also a second sense in which globalization might corrode
executive power. We sometimes make the mistake of regarding the
executive branch as a monolith. But it is not: within the executive, there
is also a tension between the political class-consisting of the president,
political appointees, and their advisors-and the permanent
bureaucracy. One of the features of the neoliberal age was a heightened
appreciation of this tension. The Reagan administration came into
power with a strong sense that the bureaucracy wielded too much
influence over its political masters. "What is actually in place here," one
conservative advisor said at the time, with reference to the career civil
service, "is a permanent, self-enclosed system that operates on its own
terms, toward its own ends, according to its own laws. This system of
permanent government defers only reluctantly to manifestations of
public sentiments in elections." 37 A similar view prevailed within the
35. See Alasdair Roberts, The Nation-State Not Dead Yet, 39 WILSON
cf.

Q.

5 (2015). But

ALASDAIR ROBERTS, THE COLLAPSE OF FORTRESS BUSH: THE CRISIS OF AUTHORITY IN

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 1-5 (2008) (arguing that the administrations of President George
W. Bush also grappled with the corrosive effects of globalization on the authority of
national governments, a fact generally neglected by critics of Bush's "imperial
presidency").
36. STRANGE, supra note 27, at 3.
37. M. Stanton Evans, Steering the Elephant, in STEERING THE ELEPHANT: HOW
WASHINGTON WORKS 1, 2 (Robert Rector & Michael Sanera eds., 1999). See generally
DONALD

P.

MOYNIHAN

AND

ALASDAIR

S. ROBERTS,

The

Triumph of Loyalty over
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conservative government of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
in the 1980s. The main goal of civil servants, one writer said, was to
"advance their own careers and improve their own lives." 38 In both
countries, the drive was to find new ways of reasserting political
influence over the bureaucracy-for example, by undertaking more
aggressive oversight of key bureaucrats, limiting bureaucratic tenure,
and sharpening material incentives for public servants to pursue
politically defined objectives.
However, the neoliberal project that was launched by the Reagan
and Thatcher governments had some unexpected consequences with
regard to the balance of power between politicians and bureaucrats. The
project was often regarded as one that was aimed at liberating markets
and restricting the role of the state.3 9 In particular, barriers to crossborder trade and finance were to be reduced. This meant a revival of a
globalized economy. But there were still ways in which this globalized
economy had to be managed. Methods had to be found for coordinating
monetary and fiscal policy, as well as regulation in a wide variety of
areas-banking, insurance, antitrust policy, securities trading, food and
drug safety, environmental policy, and so on. This proved to be highly
technical work. It was naturally the province of bureaucrats, not
politicians. Thus the neoliberal project had the effect of bolstering the
role of the "permanent government" even while leaders of that project
complained about their influence.
One example of this phenomenon can be found in the domain of
central banking. Sound money was a key element of the neoliberal
platform. In practice, this meant bolstering the autonomy of central
banks so that they would be protected from pressure to pursue policies
that promoted short-term growth at the risk of increased inflation.
There was a worldwide movement toward formal central bank
independence after 1980.4 At the same time, central bankers also
developed more sophisticated techniques for communicating and
coordinating among themselves. "In the view of Martin Marcussen, the
world witnessed the emergence of a "trans-governmental governance
network" of central bankers-a "more or less formalized institutional
Competence- The Bush Administrationand the Exhaustion of the PoliticizedPresidency, 70
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 572 (2010) (reviewing the George W. Bush administration's extreme
efforts to gain greater political control of the federal bureacracy by rewarding loyal
supporters and prioritizing political goals).
38. The Trap: What Happened to Our Dream of Freedom? Part 1 (BBC television
broadcast Mar. 11, 2007).
39. See DANIEL YERGIN, & JOSEPH STANISLAW. THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE
BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY Chap. 4 & 12 (Simon & Schuster 1998).
40. See ALASDAIR ROBERTS, THE LOGIC OF DISCIPLINE: GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE
ARCHITECTURE OF GOVERNMENT 34 (2010).
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framework" for development of central bank policy whose core is "small,
coherent, and tightly interconnected." 41 Similarly, Anne Marie
Slaughter argued "that central banks constructed a "dense web of
relations" that serve as a conduit for policy deliberations and also for
information about central bankers' "reputations . . . concerning
competence, quality, integrity, and professionalism." 42 This transgovernmental network has had the effect of bolstering the power of
central banks against other domestic actors, including both heads of
government and legislators. Central bankers are able to defend their
own positions by appealing to the prevailing wisdom within the global
network. Indeed, the network may impose reputational costs on central
bankers who bend to political influence.
Central bankers have constructed a global "epistemic community":
that is, a transnational "network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area." 43
They are not alone in this respect. Every policy domain that requires
cross-border coordination has the effect of promoting the emergence of
such a community, which in turn has the effect of providing national
experts with more resources for defending their position in the context
of national politics. One recent study observes that "a number of recent
empirical studies indicate that national agencies' participation in
transnational
networks
challenges
entrenched national
actor
constellations by empowering the agencies vis-a-vis their parent
ministries." 44 The effect has been closely studied in the context of the
European Union, where researchers have found that in a variety of
policy areas, ranging from antitrust to privacy, the integration of
domestic regulators into EU-level networks has had the effect of
enhancing their "policy autonomy" at home. 45 The end result is that the
41. Id. at 37 (quoting Martin Marcussen, The Transnational Governance Network of
Central Bankers, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF

(Dielic and Sahlin-Anderson, eds., 2006)
42. Id (quoting ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW

REGULATION

WORLD ORDER,

54 (Princeton Univ.

Pres., 2004)
43. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination,46 INT'L ORG., Winter 1992, at 1, 3 (1992).
44. Tobias Bach,et al., The DifferentialEmpowering Effects of Europeanization on the
Autonomy of National Agencies, 28 GOVERNANCE: INT'L J. POLY, ADMIN., & INSTS., JULY
2015, AT 285, 286 (2015).
45. See generally Tobias Bach & Eva Ruffing, Networking for Autonomy? National
Agencies in European Networks, 91 PUB. ADMIN., no. 3, at 712 (2013) (addressing EU
agencies and their autonomy); Ole Andreas Danielsen & Kutsal Yesilkagit, The Effects of
European Regulatory Networks on the Bureaucratic Autonomy of National Regulatory
Authorities, 14 PUB. ORG. REV. 353 (2014) (reviewing the effect of agency autonomy on EU
regulating bodies); Abraham L. Newman, Building Transnational Civil Liberties:
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power of the executive branch relative to the legislative branch is
increased-but this power is held by technocrats rather than politicians
within the executive branch.

III. Tm REAL DRIVERS OF EXECUTIVE POWER
The purpose of this paper has been to examine the proposition that
the current trend toward globalization has tended to upset the balance
of powers within the American system of government, by advantaging
the executive over the legislative and judicial branches. The argument
so far has been that the proposition is overstated or misguided. It is
overstated because globalization is actually a very old phenomenon, and
its indisputable effect in enhancing executive power was mainly realized
decades ago. It may be misguided in the sense that the effects of
globalization in undermining executive power have been neglected. For
example, globalization may weaken the sovereignty of states, and thus
the power of all actors within those states, including political executives.
Globalization may also shift the balance of power within the executive
branch away from elected officials and toward experts within the
permanent bureaucracy.
If we are concerned about the accretion of executive power, there are
probably causal factors other than globalization that deserve more
attention. One such factor is the advance of information technology. The
constant improvement of communications-for example, through
railway mail, telegraphy, wireless and cable broadcasting, the internet,
and mobile telephony-has had the effect of shifting public perceptions
about distribution of responsibilities among federal, state, and local
governments. Controversies or problems that might have remained local
matters a century ago are more likely today to attract national
attention, and thus to require some kind of response from national
authorities, including the president. The classic illustration of this
tendency was the effect of television on perceptions about the role of the
federal government in enforcing civil rights in the 1960s.4 Today, two
areas in which this trend is observable are the use of excessive force by
police and the response to natural disasters such as Hurricane Sandy.
Because these events are now universally and immediately observable,

Transgovernmental Entrepreneurs and the European Data Privacy Directive, 62 INT'L
ORG., Winter 2008, at 103 (2008) (covering privacy policy in this context).
46. See generally ANIKO BODROGHKOZY, EQUAL TIME: TELEVISION AND THE CIVIL

RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2012) (discussing how television coverage of civil right groups aided
in gaining national attention for the movements).
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they command a response from the federal government-and in
particular the president-more than they did a half-century ago.
The simple fact of competition between parties may also explain the
gradual shift of policy responsibilities to the federal level and the
growing prominence of the president on the political stage. For example,
the growing role of the federal government in the domain of education
policy could be a product of intensified electoral competition. Even
Republican administrations, who otherwise profess a commitment to
limiting the role of federal government, have been prepared to expand
the federal role in education, because it is a policy that appeals to
middle class voters. 47 The incentive to engage in such competitive
bidding may be increased by the closeness of many recent presidential
races.
Constitutional and statutory constraints are supposed to moderate
the effects of political competition. The capacity of presidential
candidates to make more expansive promises in exchange for votes is
supposed to be controlled by constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction
and by statutory limits on agency powers. It could be argued, though,
that these legal constraints have been significantly weakened by the
federal judiciary over the course of many years. For example, courts
have endorsed more expansive interpretations of federal powers, largely
abandoned the nondelegation doctrine, and adopted more flexible
standards on the interpretation of statutes.48 The result may be that
candidates have more discretion to make bigger commitments to voters.
Overall, however, the trend with regard to executive power over the
last four decades is difficult to discern. The conventional narrative,
about the consolidation of an "imperial presidency," is probably too
simplistic. 49 And perhaps the questions we are asking-Is the federal
executive too powerful? What factors aggravate the consolidation of
executive power?-are framed incorrectly. For many people, the
complaint about the federal government is that it is simply
"dysfunctional."5 0 Another way to think about the problem of

47. See Rebecca Jacobsen & Andrew Saultz, The Polls-Trends: Who Should Control
Education?, 76 PuB. OPINION Q., JuNE 2012, AT 379, 382-85 (2012).
48. See Ronald A. Cass, Vive la Deference?: Rethinking the Balance Between
Administrative and JudicialDiscretion, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1294, 1298 (2015).
49. For a recent example, see Ed Rogers, The Failed Obama Presidency, WASH. POST
(Jan. 30, 2016), availableat httpsJ/www.washingtonpostcom/blogspost-partisan/wpt2016/01/29the
-insiders the-filed-obama-presidency-is-what-fuels-trump-and-sinks-clintontut
term=.13807ff3c083
(describing the rise of Donald Trump in contrast to Barack Obama).
50. See generally Aseem Prakash & Matthew Potoski, Dysfunctional Institutions?
Toward a New Agenda in Governance Studies, 10 REG. & GOVERNANCE , no. 2, at 115
(2016) (examining why institutional dysfunction occurs); Graham K Wilson,
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governance at the federal level would be to focus on the general
attributes of a well-performing or "functional" system. Such a system
would be competent in performing essential tasks, sustaining a high
level of legitimacy, and have the capacity to adapting in response to
changing circumstances. The question might then be whether the
attainment of these three qualities-competency, legitimacy, and
adaptability-is compromised today, because of the way in which power
the permanent
is distributed among the political executive,
bureaucracy, Congress, and the judiciary.

Dysfunctional Government at Home and Abroad, 94 B.U. L. REV. 971 (2014) (reviewing
how the U.S. governmental processes are not operating normally).
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